

Extract from Interrogation of Hideki Tojo  
21 February 1946, Case File #20, Serial #80, pp. 2-3, 4

"Q You and the cabinet realized, did you not, that the shorter the notice given the United States, the more probability there was of a mishap?

"A It can be said so, theoretically.

"Q Did you and the cabinet not recognize that as a practical possibility?

"A Yes, from the practical point of view, it is also true that the shorter the time allowed, the more chance of a hitch, but it is not enough to leave it at that. Ambassador NOMURA was a very responsible official and we relied upon his carrying out so grave a responsibility perfectly. Also, the Foreign Office had time to study and perfect all phases of the procedure in the light of its great responsibility.

"Q Why was not the message itself sent sooner to Ambassador NOMURA so that there would be sufficient time?

"A I can't answer such a question as that. It is a problem for the Foreign Minister. The orders were that the final note was to be surely delivered. Since the Foreign Ministry had such an order, the question of how or why it was not carried out is a technical one which is the responsibility of the Foreign Minister.

"Q Did not you and the members of the cabinet see the contents of the note before it was sent?

"A I heard the gist of it. The cabinet all heard it at the Liaison Conference just preceding the Imperial Conference.

"Q Did not you and the cabinet agree with the contents of that message?

"A Yes, we did agree. The gist of the note was explained by the Foreign Minister at the Liaison Conference meeting. The whole text was not read and passed about. After the meeting, the matter became the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry.

"Q This Liaison Conference, at which the gist of the final note was read, was the last one before the Imperial Conference of December 1st or 2nd, was it not?

"A Yes.

"Q And all members present agreed with the substance of the message as it was read to them?

"A Yes.

"Q Why was it that that message was not sent to NOMURA until practically a week later?

"A I can't help it if you keep asking me questions about specific matters like that that were the responsibility of the Foreign Minister. I can't answer them."

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"Q You knew the attack was going to be made and approved it, did you not?

"A I knew that it was to take place, but I did not approve it because, under the Japanese system, approval by the Premier or Minister of War is not called for in a problem of command.

"Q Regardless of approval, you were in favor of such an attack being made, were you not?

"A I thought it would be good if it was successful. I thought that if the Supreme Command was confident of success that it was a good idea.

"Q You knew for a month or more previous to the attack that Admiral YAMAMOTO's plan for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor had been decided on in case of war with America?

"A No, I didn't know about it. In Japan those matters are matters of command. It was a strategic plan. Neither the government nor the War Minister would know about a Navy operating plan. That is positively the case. Command matters were kept highly secret. They were the most important secrets of all.

"Q When did you first know that, in case of war with the United States, Pearl Harbor was to be attacked?

"A I learned at the Liaison Conference just before the Imperial Conference. Before that, it was very secret."

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東條英機ニ對スル訊問ヨリノ要旨

一九四六年二月廿一日

(如二一三、四頁)

「問」貴方ト内閣ハ合衆國ニ與ヘスル通告ガ間近ニナサレレバナサレル程ノレダケ間違ノ記ル可能性ガ多イ事ヲ自覺シテ居リマシタカ居リマセデシタカ。

「答」理論的ニハサウ云ヘマセリ。

「問」貴方トソノ内閣ハソレヲ實際上ノ可能性トシテ認メナカツタノデシタカ。

「答」シマシタ。實際上ノ見地カラハ時日ノ餘裕カ短カケレバ短イ丈ケ手落シ生ズル機會ノ多クナルトイフ事モ亦事實デハアリマスガ、シカシソウ言ツテ了フ丈ケデハ足りマセシ。野村大使ハ非常ニ責任感ノ強い役人デシタ。從ツテ我々ハ彼ガ非常ニ重大ナ責任ヲ完全ニ果タス事ヲ信賴シテ居リマシタ。ソレカラ又外務省ハソノ責任ノ重大サニ鑑ミアラユル面ニ亘ツテ手續ノ點ノ事ヲ研究シ手落ノナイ様ニスルタメ時間ヲカケマシタ。

「問」充分ノ時間ガアル様ニ何故野村大使ニモツ

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ト早ク通牒ソノモノヲ送ラナカツタノデスカ。

「答」私ハソノ様ナ質問ニ御答ヘスルコトハ出来マセヌ。ソレハ外務大臣ノ問題デス。最後通牒ヲ確實ニ手交スル様ニトノ訓令デアリマシタ。外務省ガサウイフ訓令ヲ受ケ取ツタカラ、如何ニシテ又ハ何故ソノ訓令ガ遂行サレナカツタカトイフ問題ハ外務大臣ノ責任タルベキ技術的問題デアリマス。

「問」貴方ト閣員ハ最後通牒ガ發送サレル前ニ其ノ内容ヲ見ナカツタノデスカ。

「答」私ハソノ要旨ヲ聞キマシタ。内閣全員ハアノ御前會議直前ノ連絡會議ニ於イテソレヲ聞キマシタ。

「問」貴方ト内閣ハソノ通牒ノ内容ニ同意シナカツタノデスカ。

「答」イ、エ、我々ハ同意シマシタ。通牒ノ要旨ハ連絡會議ニ於テ外務大臣カラ説明ガアリマシタ。全文ハ讀マレナカツタシ廻サレモシマセンデシタ。コノ會議後ハ、本件ハ外務省ノ責任トナリマシタ。

「問」最後通牒ノ要旨ガ讀マレタ此ノ連絡會議ハ



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十二月一日又ハ二日ノ御前會議前ノ最後ノ  
連絡會議デアッタノデスネ。

「答」 サウデス。

「問」 ソシテ出席全員ガ彼等ニ讀ミ聞カサレタ通  
牒ノ趣旨ニ同意シタノデスネ。

「答」 サウデス。

「問」 ソノ通牒ガ實際ノトコロ一週間後迄野村大  
使ニ送ラレナカッタノハドウシテデスカ。

「答」 外務大臣ノ責任デアルソノ様ナ細カイ事ニ  
ツイテ貴方ガ質問シ續ケラレテモ私ニハド  
ウニモ仕様ガアリマセン。私ハソレニ御答  
ヘ出来マセン。

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「問」 貴方ハ攻撃ガナサレ様トシテイル事ヲ知ッ  
テ居リ且ツソレヲ承認シタノデスネ。

「答」 私ハ攻撃ガ行ハレル事ヲ知ツテ居リマシタ、  
シカシ私ハソレヲ承認シタノデハアリマセ  
ン。何故ナラバ、日本ノ組織ノ下デハ、統  
帥問題ニツイテハ首相ヤ陸相ノ承認ハ必要  
トセラレテ居ラナイカラデアリマス。

「問」 承認トイフ事ハ如何テ措イテ、貴方ハソノ様  
ナ攻撃ガ行ハレル事ニ賛成ダッタノデハア

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リマセシカ。

「答」私ハ若シソノ攻撃ガ成功スルナラバヨイ事  
ダト思ヒマシタ。私ハ若シモ統帥部ガソノ  
成功ニツキ確信ヲ有シテ居ルナラ、ソレハ  
良イト思ヒマシタ。

「問」貴方ハ攻撃ノ一ヶ月以上モ前ニ山本大將ノ  
眞珠灣奇襲案ガ米國トノ戦争ノ場合ノ爲ニ  
決定サレテ居ル事ヲ知ツテ居マシタネ。

「答」イ、エ、私ハソノ事ニツイテ知リマセシテ  
シタ。

日本デハ、此等ノ事ハ統帥事項デアリマス。  
ソレハ作戰計畫デアリマシタ。政府モ陸軍  
大臣モ海軍ノ作戰計畫ニツイテ知ル筈ガア  
リマセン。ソレハ確カデアリマス。統帥事  
項ハ恒ク秘密ニセラレテ居リマシタ。ソレ  
等ハ秘中ノ秘トセラレテ居リマシタ。

「問」合衆國ト戦争ノ場合、眞珠灣攻撃ノ手筈デ  
アル事ヲ貴方ガ最初ニ知ツタノハ何時デシ  
タカ。

「答」アノ御前會議直前ノ連絡會議ノ折ニ私ハ知  
リマシタ。ソレ以前ニハ恒ク秘デアリマシタ。

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